In the classical herding model, asymptotic learning refers to situations where individuals eventually take the correct action regardless of their private information.
Introduction
Oftentimes, when individuals make decisions, they rely on their private information as well as on previous decisions that other individuals have made. Observational learning models have been studied on purpose to formalize and analyze this insightful behavior. The paradigmatic setup of the model (e.g. Bikhchandani et al. (1992) ) includes an infinite sequence of individuals who choose actions with the objective to match the unknown (binary) state of the world. Each individual receives a private information which is iid conditioned on the underlying state, and in addition to that, observes the entire sequence of earlier actions. Smith and Sorensen (2000) has drawn a significant attention to the scenario where the private information is arbitrarily strong (unbounded in their jargon). Informally, each individual may obtain (with positive probability) a private information in favor to one state that will overturn any strong evidence in favor to the contrary one. In other words, an individual's posterior belief can be set arbitrarily close to zero or one. When the private information is unbounded and all actions are publicly observed, Smith and Sorensen (2000) have shown that asymptotic learning occurs with probability one: individuals eventually find it optimal to 'forsake' their private information and reiterate the correct action. 1 Asymptotic rates of convergence are an important ingredient in the study of inference processes in economical and statistical theory. Nevertheless, the subject matter regarding the speed at which asymptotic learning converges has been paid a limited attention in the literature. This speed is measured by how 'quick' the public belief evolves as more actions are unfolded over time.
Since the public belief is the posterior belief that an individual assigns to the correct state of nature, it provides a measure of how well the individuals has learned the state; As formalized in Smith and Sorensen (2000) , who show that whenever the private informations are unbounded, the public belief approaches to one. This property has led to some additional evidence regarding the 'slow' speed of the convergence (see for example the recent paper by Hann-Caruthers et al. (2017) ). Motivated by this, we are challenged to identify the private information structural's conditions for which the aforementioned convergences not only happen 'quickly' but in a uniform rate. To that end, we revisit the notion of informativeness.
Private informations must not perfectly reveal the state of the world. This ensures that any (set of) informations which is possible in regard to one state, is possible in regard to the other state. In addition to that, private informations are assumed to rule out trivialities in the sense that some (set of) informations is measured differently with respect to the states. As a supplemental assumption, the last property is refined in the following manner. 1 The rationale behind this learning is that, whenever a sequence of incorrect actions is unfolding there exist individuals who will eventually put an end to it regardless of their belief assigned to the incorrect state.
Recall that private information is naturally associated with a pair of distributions corresponding to the set of states of the world. Informally, we focus on a certain wide classes of such pairs which induced learning admits a 'quick' and uniform rate of convergence. Most notably, each class is identified as bi-parametric, represented by ψ and ν in (0, 1), such that the point-wise absolute distance between one of which pairs decreases in a uniform bounded rate which is merely determined by these parameters. In particular, ψ plays as an initial constrain whereas ν determines the bounded rate parameter of converges.
Additionally, in order to exploit the state conditional stochastic properties, we embrace a substantial portion of the literature's setting and consider the ratio process between the corresponding posterior beliefs. This process is shown to converge 'quickly' as the distance between the corresponding pairs decreases fast. Our main result shows that one of which ratio processes corresponding to the same bi-parametric class identification, represented by some ψ and ν, converges 'quickly' and in a uniform bounded rate which is solely determined by ψ and ν. It is further argued that, once we relax the bi-parametric constrain, the ratio process may converge very slow.
It is well known (Smith and Sorensen (2000) ) that the ratio process is a state conditional martingale (and hence it is a suprmartingale) which converges to the correct cascade set with probability one. We introduce a new class of supermartingales, called weakly active, where one of which process admits a 'high' rate of convergence which is bounded from below by ψ (t+1) v , for any given ψ and ν at each time t.
Our ancillary results are mathematical; we show that these classes of supermartingales, identified by ψ and ν, converge uniformly. Specifically, given a precision value ε, there exits a constant time K, which entirely depends on ψ, ν and ε, such that with high 1 − ε probability the wholly processes in the associated class (uniformly) fall and remain below ε from time K onward.
An important adjunct result shows that there is a one to one correspondence between the classes of 'weakly active' supermartingales and the classes of bi-parametric private information structures. In particular we show that any ratio process which is uniquely induced from a biparametric class, identified ψ and ν, is a weakly active supermatingale defined by the same parameters.
Finally, as learning is merely asymptotically approachable, the wrong action may be coordinated with a positive probability at any finite time. In particular, the sequence of actions may not settle on the correct action from some finite time onward and more rigorously, it may require an unreasonable amount of time to put an end of a sequence of incorrect actions. Rosenberg and Vieille (2017) consider the following two criteria; Whereas one benchmark looks at how long is needed until an individual takes the correct action, the (closely related) other one measures the total number of incorrect actions. Rosenberg and Vieille (2017) view the finite expectation of these benchmarks as a simple and natural proxy of efficiency and provide a simple condition regarding information structure to verify it.
While their (necessary) condition for efficiency involves a finite indefinite integral regarding the unconditional private information's distribution, this criterion is surprisingly captured by the informativeness approach taken here in the following rigorous form; We show that the aforementioned expected times, corresponding to any bi-parametric class of information identified by ψ and ν, are not only finite but uniformly bounded by a constant which solely depends on ψ and ν and is independent of the distribution's specification in this class.
Results
We introduce a new class of inforamtive structures which are characterized as bi-parametric. We show that the stochastic ratio processes induced by these classes are identified by classes of supermartingales which are shown to admit a uniform bound on the rate of convergence. Additionally, we argue that once the informativeness assumption is relaxed, then either a 'fast' convergence occurs or the associated private information distributions are sufficiently 'close', yielding that less information about the true state of the world is obtained.
As the stochastic ratio process converges 'slowly', it is commonly associated with a variety of efficiency indications. In particular, under the proposed bi-parametric constrain, we show that the expected times of the first incorrect action as well as the total number of incorrect actions are finite and uniformly bounded. Chamley (2004) provides an estimation for the the public belief unfolding in case for which the associated private information distributions admit 'fat tails' in his jargon. He also reports some numerical evidence in the Gaussian case using a computer simulation. Hann-Caruthers et al. (2017) argue that the rate growth of the result in ratio process, associated with individuals who observe actions, is sub-exponentially close. Vives (1993) , studies the speed of sequential learning in a model with actions chosen from a continuum where individuals observe an information with error term regarding their predecessors' actions. He similarly shows that learning is significantly slower than in the threshold case (for further overview of this literature please refer to Vives (2010), Chapter 6). For specific information structure, some bounds on the probability that an individual takes the incorrect action have been established. Under the assumption that private informations are uniformly distributed, Lobel et al. Much of the literature has focused on the long-term outcomes of learning. As aforestated, when private informations are unbounded, the individuals eventually choose the correct action with probability one. Hence, a natural question one may arise is how long does it take for that to happen and study its expectation. Smith and Sorensen (1996) , an early version of Smith and Sorensen (2000) , addressed this issue showing that the expected time to learn is infinite for some private information structures.
Related literature
They further conjecture that this result is extended to an arbitrary structure, which on the contrary, is shown to be false. Rosenberg and Vieille (2017) have studied related questions. In particular, they identify a simple condition on the unconditional private information distributions for which the expected times until the first correct action, as well as the number of incorrect actions, are finite. Furthermore, Hann-Caruthers et al. (2017) poses a different assumption on the conditional private information distributions' tails for which the expected time to learn is finite.
Those two approaches are distilled here collectively as the aforementioned expected times are captured under our new informativeness notion.
Model
The general framework includes the Nature who chooses a binary state of the world within S = {L, H}. For notional simplicity both states are assumed to be drawn likely. A sequence of shortlived individuals make decisions in turn. In round t, an individual t chooses an action from the set A = {1, ..., m, ..., M } with the objective of matching the underlying unknown state .
Let U : S × A −→ be a payoff function. In each state s ∈ {L, H} an individual earns a payoff U(s, m) from the action m and seeks to maximize his payoff. It is assumed that U(H, m) is increasing in m whereas U(L, m) is decreasing, and in particular no action is optimal over another at one belief. This will avoid that no pair of actions provides identical payoffs in all states. It will further ensure that each individual has two extreme actions, each is strictly optimal in some state. Particularly, action M is optimal for H where action 1 is optimal for L. The remaining M − 2 actions are taken when the state's belief is not certain.
Private belief: Each individual receives a random signal about the true state of the world and then uses Bayes rule to compute his private belief. 2 Conditional on the states H, L, a private belief (rather then a signal) is drawn iid according to some cdfs: F L , F H , respectively. It 2 We adopt the common literature terminology and refer to that belief as the private information an individual assigns to the states, given his own information.
is further assumed that F L , F H have a common support, say supp(F), such that the convex hull 
Posterior belief: Given a posterior belief r ∈ [0, 1] that the true state is H, the expected payoff for choosing action m is r U(H, m) + (1 − r)U(L, m). As each individual maximizes his expected payoff, U and r naturally induce a unique thresholds:
so that each interval I m := [r m−1 , r m ] is associated with an optimal action m that the expected payoff of choosing action m is maximal. Additionally, in equilibrium, each individual can compute the probability that the state is H after any history of choices of all previous individuals. This probability is referred to the public belief and is denoted by q. Applying Bayes rule for a given public belief q and a private belief p, the posterior belief r that the state is H satisfies
.
(2)
Game timing: For each t, individual t observes his private signal and all actions of previous individuals, using Bayes rule he then updates his posterior belief and chooses an action which maximizes his payoff accordingly.
Threshold: Since the right hand side of (2) is increasing in p, there are private belief thresholds
corresponding to inequalities (1) so that, given q, an individual chooses the action m if and only if his private belief p ∈ (p m−1 (q), p m (q)]. Equality (2) further implies that each threshold p m (q)
is decreasing in q.
Cascade set: Each action m is associated with a set of public beliefs J m = {q| supp(F) ⊆ (p m−1 (q), p m (q)]}. Hence, an individual takes an action m almost surely whenever q ∈ int(J m ).
Asymptotic learning
Let q t be the public belief that the state is H which, using Bayes rule, is updated accordingly after individual t chooses an action. Conceptually, since we are interested in the conditional stochastic properties that the state is H, it is more convenience to consider the public likelihood ratio l t ≡ 1−q t q t that the state is L versus H.
The following analogues can then be inferred; for each q the public belief thresholds arē Since, conditional on l t , an individual t chooses the action m if and only if his private belief
, it follows that the corresponding likelihood public belief at time t + 1, l t+1 , is updated according to the likelihood posterior belief
(1−r t ) r t . Hence, as each state is equally likely, it is natural to describe the stochastic processL :
where the transition
is the probability that an individual takes the action m given l where the true state is s ∈ {H, L}.
Consequently, the cascade setJ m is the interval of the likelihoods l such that
and further, as the likelihood posterior belief jumps above one whenever an individual follows an incorrect action, it can be inferred that for every partial sequence of actions a 1 , ..., a t+1 ,
and only if a t+1 = 1.
Uniform estimation
Recall that a pair of cdfs, (F L , F H ), together with an initial probability P(H) = P(L) = 1 2 induce a unique stochastic process l t which satisfies equation (4). Additionally, recall that when F L , F H are unbounded, l t converges almost surly to the cascade setJ M = {0} corresponding to the true action M . As the transitions converge to one, by (6), the process l t decays 'slowly' to zero (For suplemental details please refer to Hann-Caruthers et al. (2017) , Theorems 1,2). Hence, we are motivated to establish a class of processes which will not only dismantle, in some extent, this 'sluggishness' convergence in moderation, but admit a uniform rate of converges. To capture this idea let us consider the following class of unbounded private beliefs cdfs. H) started atl 0 = 1. In words, for each t ≥ 0 the value ofl t is associated with a particular partial history of choices in which all individuals, from day one to t, pick the correct action M .
Hence, (l t ) t≥0 is monotone decreasing to zero and the random variable l t admitsl t ≤ l t for all t ≥ 0. In addition, let us denote by ∆(p) = |F L (p) − F H (p)| to be the distance between two corresponding cdf ′ s at p.
for all t ≥ 0.
In order to justify the information structure in which the private belief p (rather than private signal) is iid conditioned on the underlying state, the following correspondence must arise from
Bayesian updating: f (p) = (1 − p)/p almost surely in (0, 1). This immediately implies that ∆(p)
is non-decreasing as p < 1/2, and furthermore, since it is strict whenever p ∈ supp(F) \ {1/2}, it follow that F H < F L , except when both terms are 0 or 1. For further details please refer to Lemma A.1 in Smith and Sorensen (2000).
Therefore, the (ψ, ν) -informativeness assumption entails the following restriction: whereas ∆(p) weakly decreases as p tends to zero, this distance, on a particular sample sequencel t , cannot decay too slowly but at rate of at least ψ (t+1) ν . A pair of cdfs which complies with this restriction admits thick (weakly monotonic) tails.
Furthermore, since the thresholds {p M −1 (l)} l≥0 are strictly decreasing to zero then the monotonic of ∆(p) together with (7) yield
The next theorem provides a characterization of unbounded private beliefs. Notably, the construction includes a wide class of distributions which complies with Definition (1). In particular, it is argued that when the distance between the tails of F L and F H are sufficiently thick then the (conditional) probability that strong signals vanishes slowly enough is high. Hereinafter, P H is referred to the conditional probability which by F H .
The proof of Theorem 1 is supplemented to the Appendix. In the next theorem we establish a uniform bound on the rate of the convergence corresponding to any process l t which is induced by (ψ, ν) -informative private beliefs. The theorem asserts that all such processes decay at a rate which is uniformly bounded.
Theorem 2. Let ε, ψ, ν ∈ (0, 1). Then for allL < 1 there is a finite time
In words, the uniformity theorem asserts that given (ψ, ν) and a precision ε, there exists a constant time K, which depends only on these three parameters, such that after exactly first K guesses not only that the likelihood public belief process at time K + 1, l K+1 , falls below ε near the cascade set but, due to the fact that p M −1 (l t ) is decreasing in t, p M −1 (l K+1 ) is near zero and hence an individual K + 1 is guaranteed that all the individuals thereafter will choose the correct action M with high probability of at least ρ(M |l K+1 , H). Consequently, in the later scenario, there is an upper uniform bound on the time after which all individuals will choose the correct action with at least that uniform probability.
The uniformity stated in Theorem 2 implies the following corollary.
Corollary 1. For all ε, ψ, ν ∈ (0, 1) there exists a finite K = K(ψ, ν, ε) such that for all pairs
The next theorem analyzes the rate of converges of l regardless of the type of the private belief distributions which may be bounded or unbounded. To this end, we shell first introduce the notion 'close' private beliefs.
In words, private beliefs are ε close given l if it induces sufficiently close transitions for all actions m. In the following theorem the assumption of (ψ, ν) -informativeness is relaxed, more over, the theorem holds for all types of private beliefs which might be either bounded or unbounded.
In particular, it is shown that the rate of converges does not depend on the specification of the private beliefs but only on the distance between the corresponding transitions.
Theorem 3. For all ε, ψ, ν ∈ (0, 1) there exists a finite K = K(ψ, ν, ε) such that for all pairs (F L , F H ) and for all n > 0, there is a P H -probability of at least (1 − ε) that:
In words, as individual n observes the whole previous actions as well as the past associated transitions, Theorem 3 asserts that, given an arbitrarily small ε > 0, there exists a finite uniform bound K, which is independent of any pair of private belief, such that if that individual faces more than K periods in which the corresponding transitions were sufficiently differed, then, whenever the private beliefs are unbounded, not only that the public belief process at time n, l n , falls below ε near the cascade set but, the second part of theorem ensures us that individual n is guaranteed that all the individuals thereafter will choose the correct action M with high probability of at least ρ(M |l n , H). Consequently, in the later scenario, there is an upper uniform bound on the time after which all individuals will choose the correct action with at least that probability.
When the private belief are (ψ, ν) -informative the first part of Theorem 3 is ruled out and hence Theorem 3 is coincided Theorem 2. As a result, with a probability of at least (1 − ε) the correct action will be chosen after exactly K periods.
By (Smith and Sorensen (2000), Lemma 2) we know that, with bounded belief, there exist 0 < l − < − l < ∞ such that the non-empty cascade sets corresponding to actions 1 and M areJ
, respectively, where all the other cascade sets are possibly empty. Consequently, since from Theorem 3 we are provided with only two events which occurs with high probability 1− ε, and the event in which the process l lies inJ 1 is obtained with a positive probability, we conclude that incorrect 'learning' (.i.e. herding) must occur very 'slowly' as the difference between the transitions becomes less that ψ t ν in all but few periods K, whereas l t might converge 'quickly' toJ M . Furthermore, the constant K is universal as it does not depend on underlying pair's specification.
Supermartingale characterization
Intuitively, a supermartingale is a process that decreases on average. Let us further consider the following class of supermartingales called active supermartingales. This notion has been first introduced in Fundernberg and Levine (1992) who study reputations in infinitely repeated games.
Consider an abstract setting with a finite set Ω and probability measure P in ∆(Ω) equipped with a natural filtration.
In word, a supermartingale has activity ψ if the probability of a jump of size ψ at time t exceeds ψ for almost all histories. Note thatL being a supermartingale, is weakly decreasing in expectations. Showing that it is active implies thatL t substantially goes up or down relative tõ L t−1 with probability bounded away from zero in each period. Fundenberg and Levine (1992) Theorem A.1, showed the following remarkable result
for every active supermartingaleL withL 0 ≡ l 0 and activity ψ.
Theorem 4 asserts that ifL is an active supermartingale with activity ψ then there is a fixed time K by which, with high probability,L t drops below L − and remains below L − for all future periods. It should be noted that the power of the theorem stems from the fact that the bound, K, depends solely on the parameters ε > 0, ψ and L − , and is otherwise independent of the underlying stochastic process P.
Nevertheless, in the framework of social learning, non of the public belief likelihood ratios l t exploits the active supermartingale property for any ψ ∈ (0, 1), as equation (6) implies that its transitions converges to one. Hence, we are strongly motivated to extend Definition 3 to a much wider class of supermatingales which will include l t , and furthermore, as l t converges to the cascade set {0}, extend Theorem 4 to achieve a uniform bound on the rate of convergence of l t . To this end, let us introduce the following new wide class of supermartinglaes, called weakly actives.
Definition 4. Let ψ, v ∈ (0, 1). A non-negative supermartingaleL := {L t } ∞ t=0 is weakly active with activity ψ and rate v under P if
for all historiesω t such thatL t (ω) > 0.
In words, a supermartingale has activity ψ and rate v if the probability of a jump of size ψ (t+1) v at time t exceeds ψ (t+1) v for almost all histories.L being a supermartingale, is weakly decreasing in expectations. The assumption that it is weakly active asserts that it cannot decay or grow too slowly. That is, there exists a bound on the rate of converges ofL t , in such a manner thatL t must not go up or down relative toL t−1 in a considerably rate with a probability converges to zero in the same bounded rate. It should be noted that the class of supermartingales corresponding to v = 0 and a constant ψ ∈ (0, 1) includes those processes which were defined in Definition 3. In the next theorem the uniformity result presented in Theorem 4 is extended to include the class of all weakly active supermartingles.
Theorem 5. Let ε, ψ, v ∈ (0, 1), and l 0 > 0. Then, for allL ∈ (0, l 0 ) there is a time K < ∞ such that P({ω : sup t>KL t (ω) ≤L}) ≥ 1 − ε for every weakly active supermartingaleL with activity ψ and rate v withL 0 ≡ l 0 . 4
The power of the theorem stems from the fact that the integer K, depends only on the parameters l 0 , ε > 0, ψ, v andL, and is otherwise independent of the particular supermartingale selected. The theorem asserts that ifL is a weakly active supermartingale, then there is a fixed time K by which, with high probability,L drops belowL and remains belowL for all future periods.
Theorem 6. For every ψ, v ∈ (0, 1), there exists a pair of cdfs, F H (ψ,v) , F L (ψ,v) , such that the induced public belief likelihood ratio is a weakly active supermartingale with activity ψ and rate v.
It should be emphasized that the values of ν are restricted to be varied between in (0, 1). If ν = 0 then inequality (10) takes the form of an active supermartingale which rules out equations (6), if ν > 1 on the other hand, then the process l t fails to satisfy the uniformity property as stated in Theorem 6.
Efficiency
The expected time until individuals stop taking the wrong action can be either finite or infinite as the induced stochastic process converges 'slowly' to the cascade set. Conceptually, this section further studies how the learning efficiency might be evaluated. To this end, let us consider the following stopping times; the first time of the correct action τ = in f {t : a t = M }, the aggregate amount of the incorrect actions N = |{t : a t = M }|, the time to learn T H = min{t : a n = M for all n ≥ t}, and the time of the first mistake T 1 = min{t : a t = M }. The learning efficiency is referred to the finite expected value of these random variables.
The next theorem asserts that whenever the corresponding cdf's are (ψ, v) -informative then 
Theorem 8. There existψ,v ∈ (0, 1) and K = K(ψ,v) > 0 such that for all ψ >ψ and ν <v, and for all pairs
as ψ → 1 and ν → 0.
Proof of Theorem 8. By proposition 1 there exist K = K(ψ, v) , and a pair (
By a symmetric argument the same conclusion holds for s = L. Consequently, the expected time to learn E[T H ] is uniformly bounded by a constant which solely depends on (ψ, v) and the result follows.
As T 1 < T H the following corollary is inferred.
Corollary 2. There existψ,v ∈ (0, 1) and K = K(ψ,v) > 0 such that for all ψ >ψ and ν <v, and for all pairs
Concluding remarks
The classical setting of asymptotic learning is revisited where individuals converge to the correct action and correct belief regardless of their private information assigned to the incorrect state of the world. Nevertheless, recent papers have shown that the prospective time to learn may take ages to infinity. The paper proposes a simple criterion on the private information structures and focuses on the result in time to learn appraisal. Whenever the private information is unbounded, the criterion constitutes a characterization in which the induced time to learn shares a common sharp bound. It is further argued that the learning is efficient. For a general information structure, it provides a universal constant K such that with any desired degree of precision at any fixed time n, only two scenarios hold; either the learning has begun or the proposed criterion fails to hold in more than K periods by n. Thus, the utility of the action a t = 1, 2 is 1 if and only if the state of the world is H, L, respectively, and zero otherwise.
Proof of Theorem 1. Fix (ψ, ν) ∈ (0, 1) 2 and for ψ < b < a < 1 let
Let {b t } t≥1 be a positive increasing to infinity sequence and consider the following function
Consider the following probability functions over the integers:
C , t ∈ , one of which is associated with an accumulated distribution function F H , F L , respectively. Note that for all t ≥ 1 (12) and (13) we obtain
Now, for all s ∈ {L, H} letF
other be the corresponding cdf on [0, 1], and observe that, due to (2), a simple calculation shows that the corresponding threshold is given by p 1 (l) = l 1+l . Hence, since
then, following Definition 1, we need to show that
which from (14) and the fact that
We will first show that f 1 (lo g( 1 l t )−1) > ψ (t+1) ν C for all t ≥ 1, then we are provided by a sufficiently large sequence {b t } t≥1 such that inequality (15) holds for all t ≥ 1. Note that for all t ≥ 1
. Now, using equation (4), set (iteratively) 1
1−F L (l o g(l i )) starting atl 0 = 1 (corresponding to p 1 (l 0 ) = l 0 1+l 0 = 1 2 ). Hence, since for all t ≥ 0,l t ≤ l t and so 1
Note that from (4) we have
).
Hence, by judicious choice of a, b, and {b t } t≥1 , it is sufficient to show that the sequence {lo g(
is monotone decreasing to zero and that 1
. For the first part, it is sufficient to show that {lo g(
1−F L (−t) )} t≥1 is monotone converges to zero. To this end, from (12) and (13) and the fact that
for the monotonic of {lo g(
1−F L (−t) )} t≥1 we note that, since f 1 (t) decreases to zero it follows that for all t ≥ 1 there exists a large enoughb t such that for all b t >b t we have (−t−1) and since the lo g is monotonic the result follows. For the second part, observe that we need to show that
. Now, observe that, setting b 1 = 0, we have
and so, setting a = b+1 and since C < 2a from (11), it follows that e
and hence it is sufficient to show that there exists ψ < b, a such that
Indeed, by elementary consideration it can be shown that (16) holds for any b in the interval [ψ, ψ( e e−1 )] which is sufficiently close to ψ( e e−1 ). Denote such an element byband observe that there exists sufficiently large increasing sequence {b t } t≥2 such that for all b t >b t one has e < 1
and the result follows. It should be noted that as the sequence {b} t t≥1 is judiciously chosen to 'enlarge' the tail difference between the corresponding cdf's, the parameters a, b was chosen to bound the first value of 1 l t .
Consider a general setting in which
Lemma 1. The process L 0 ≡ 1, L t (ω) :=
Proof. It follows that for every ω, t :
, and as a result
It should be noted that if P 1 ≪ P 0 then a∈Ω: P 0 (a|ω t−1 )>0 P 1 (a|ω t−1 ) = 1 result in L t being a martingale.
B The faster process and its implication

B.1 Construction
Define an increasing sequence of stopping times {τ k } ∞ k=0 relative to {L t } t≥0 and ε inductively as follows: first set τ 0 ≡ 0 and for all
Define the faster process:
Note that {L k } ∞ k=0 is defined with respect to the stopping times {τ k } ∞ k=0 which is adapted to an associated filtration whose events are denoted byω k . 6
for almost all historiesω k−1 such thatL k−1 (ω) > 0.
In word, a supermartingale has activity ψ if the probability of a jump of size ψ at time t exceeds ψ for almost all histories.
Lemma 2. For all ε > 0, the faster process {L k } k≥0 relative to the process {L t } t≥0 is an active supermartingale (under P 0 ) with activity ε 2#A .
Proof. Since {τ k } ∞ k=0 are stopping times and {L t } t≥0 is a supermartingale, it follows by lemma 1 that {L k } ∞ k=0 is a supermartingale (verify). Now letω ∈ Ω ∞ , k > 0 such thatL k−1 (ω) > 0, we need to show that
To see this, let s = τ k−1 (ω) and note that τ k−1 (ω) = s, ∀ω ∈ω s and sinceω s is cylinder it follows that L s (ω) ≡ L s (ω) > 0, ∀ω ∈ω s , and in addition, τ k ( * |ω s ) is a random variable which denotes the first time after k − 1 times conditional on the event which consists all ω ′ s for which τ k−1 (ω) = s and ω s ∈ω s . 7 Hence, in terms of equation (17) it is enough to show that
where L ∞ is defined to be the constant zero. Now note that the sets: are disjoint, and that for any ω, one of these three sets must be used to choose τ k (ω). Hence, it is enough to show that equation (18) holds conditional on each set and thus it holds averaging over all of them.
Conditional on {rule 3} :
Conditional on {rule 1} : since condition 1 holds we obtain that τ k (ω) = t for allω ∈ ω t−1 and thus 7 0 <L k−1 (ω) = L τ k−1 (ω) (ω) = L s (ω) P 0 ({ω :
Now note that if condition 2 was satisfied at time τ k (ω) − 1 then τ k (ω) would not be the infimum on all t > τ k−1 (ω) such that condition 1 holds at time t = τ k (ω). Therefore, condition 2 was not used at time τ k (ω) − 1 just before time τ k (ω), which yields that
Since for all ω that satisfies
Combining (19) and (20) shows that
and the result follows.
B.2 Linkage between the faster process and distance of measures
Definition 6. For ω, t > 0, P 0 , P 1 denote by
to be the distance between the conditional distributions P 0 , P 1 over outcomes corresponding to
The next lemma shows that given any history,ω t−1 , the likelihood ratio is likely to substantially fall whenever ∆(ω t−1 ) > ε Lemma 3. Let 0 < ε < 1, 0 < t,ω, P 0 , P 1 such that P 0 (ω t−1 ) > 0 and ∆(ω t−1 ) > ε, then
Proof. Denote A = {a 1 , a 2 , ..., a M } and note that ∀ω, t > 0 with L t−1 (ω) > 0 one has
P 0 (ω t |ω t−1 ) and so conditional onω t−1 the random variable L t L t−1 is distributed, with respect to P 0 , as follows:
. Consequently, it suffices to show that for some m ∈ {1, ..., M } :
By hypothesis, ∆(ω t−1 ) = ma x a∈A {|P 1 (a|ω t−1 ) − P 0 (a|ω t−1 )|} ≥ ε. 8 Suppose without loss of generality that this maximum attains at m = 1, hence, |P 1 (a 1 |ω t−1 ) − P 0 (a 1 |ω t−1 )| ≥ ε.
where dividing the last inequality by P 0 (a 1 |ω t−1 ) yields that ε M ≤ ε ≤ ε P 0 (a 1 |ω t−1 ) ≤ 1 − P 1 (a 1 |ω t−1 ) P 0 (a 1 |ω t−1 ) and we are done.
(P 0 (a m |ω t−1 ) − P 1 (a m |ω t−1 )).
8 Lemma 3 can be stated equivalently: if there exists m such that |P 1 (a m |ω t−1 )− P 0 (a m |ω t−1 )| ≥ ε then P 0 ({ω :
Hence, the negation yields that for any m : |P 1 (a m |ω t−1 ) − P 0 (a m |ω t−1 )| < ε.
Consequently,
{P 0 (a m |ω t−1 )−P 1 (a m |ω t−1 )}. W.l.o.g assume that the maximum attains at m = 2.
where dividing the last inequality by P 0 (a 2 |ω t−1 ) we conclude once again that
B.3 A uniform bound on the rate of convergence of all weakly active supermartingale with
activity ψ and rate ν with an initial value l 0
Before we state and prove the theorem about a uniform bound on the rate of convergence, we will use some fundamental results from the theory of supermartingales. In particular, bounds on the "upcrossing numbers" which we introduce below. The result can be found in Neveu (1975, Chapter 2).
Fact 1. For any positive supermartingale L and any c > 0,
For the next fact fix an interval [a, b] , 0 < a < b < ∞, and define the random variable: 
This is known as Dubin's inequality.
For the next lemma observe that an active supermartingale L with activity ψ makes jump of size ψ with probability at least ψ in each period k where L k > 0. Consequently, over a large number of periods either L has jumped to zero (and stay there since L is a supermartingale) or there are likely to be "many" jumps. Formally, given a time k > 0, define the random variable J k (ω) to the and ε ∈ (0, 1), there exists K such that either that L K (ω) = 0 and since L is a supermartingale
and there exists at least J jumps, that is there exists a sub sequence
.., J }. The next lemma formalizes the above idea. 
Now observe that since L has activity (ψ, v) then for each k > 0, Hence, for 0 < ε < 1 and J > 0 there exists sufficiently large K > 0 such that
and therefore setting the random variable S K (ω) = k<K I k (ω) we obtain In other words, by equation (22), either L K (ω) = 0, in which case, there exists 1 ≤ i ≤ J such that 0 = L k i (ω) = L k i +1 (ω) =, ..., = L K (ω), or L k (ω) > 0, ∀1 ≤ k ≤ K and there are J jumps in all periods (k i ) J i=1 (and so there exists at least J jumps in 1 ≤ k ≤ K), that is, | L ki (ω)
Lemma 5. Let ε, ψ ∈ (0, 1), and for any 0 < c < c divide the interval [c, c] into I equal subintervals with endpoints e 1 = c < e 2 <, ..., < e I +1 = c. Define the following events: Then, there exist judicious choice of c, c, I, K, N , J such that
Using Lemma 5 and the results on up-crossing theorem, which are reflected in facts 1 and fact 2, we will assert how the paths of an weakly active supermatingale looks like. By judicious choice of c, c, I, K, N , J we will ensure that (E 4 c,K ) c ⊂ (E 1 c,K ∪E 2 c,cN ,K,I ∪E 3 J ,K ) and that P(E 1 c,K ), P(E 2 c,cN ,K,I ), P(E 3 J ,K ) ≤ 3. either make "lots of jumps" or hit zero (Lemma 4).
We will use these three conditions to show that there exists large K such that, most paths remains belowL ∼ from K on. (a) . We will show that for any c, c, K, J there exist I, N such that (a) holds. Let c, c, K, J (these determines the sets E 4 c,K , E 1 c,K , E 3 J ,K ) and suppose on the contrary that
Proof of Part
K ) c and denote by L ω,K := { L k (ω)} 0≤k≤K to be the partial path of L(ω) by time K. 10 Since ω ∈ (E 1 c,K ) c ∩ (E 4 c,K ) c we have that c ≤ L ω,K ≤ c. In addition, since ω ∈ (E 3 c,K ) c = {ω : J K (ω) > J or L K (ω) = 0}, and 0 < c ≤ L ω,K , it follows that the partial path L ω,K does not hit zero and hence has J or more 10 Equivalently, let ω ∈ (E 4 c,K ) c and assume on the contrary that ω / ∈ (E 1 c,K ∪ E 2 c,cN ,K,I ∪ E 3 J,K ), thus ω ∈ (E 1 c,K ∪ E 2 c,cN ,K,I ∪ E 3 J,K ) c = (E 1 c,K ) c ∩ (E 2 c,cN ,K,I ) c ∩ (E 3 J,K ) c jumps in [c, c] one of which, corresponded to the k'th jump, is of relative size of at least ψ k for all k ∈ {1, ..., J }. Now observe that in the range above c whenever |
N <Ñ (27) then, since (E 2 c,c,N ,K,I ) c ⊂ (E 2 c,c,Ñ ,K,I ) c it follows that ω / ∈ (E 2 c,cN ,K,I ) c and so ω / ∈ (E 4 c,K ) c ∩ (E 1 c,K ) c ∩ (E 2 c,cN ,K,I ) c ∩ (E 3 J ,K ) c which yields a contradiction. As a result, (E 4 c,K ) c ⊂ (E 1 c,K ∪ E 2 c,cN ,K,I ∪ E 3 J ,K ) or equivalently (E 1 c,K ) c ∩ (E 2 c,cN ,K,I ) c ∩ (E 3 J ,K ) c = (E 1 c,K ∪ E 2 c,cN ,K,I ∪ E 3 J ,K ) c ⊂ E 4 c,K , which is interpreted as follows: for any ω such that the partial path L ω,K does not go above c ,(ω ∈ (E 1 c,K ) c ), does not up-crossed any interval more than N times by time K, (ω ∈ (E 2 c,cN ,K,I ) c ), and jumps J or more times by time K, (ω ∈ (E 3 J ,K ) c ), must fall below c, (ω ∈ E 4 c,K ).
Proof: P(E 1 c,K ) < ε 4 . Applying Fact 1 with c 1 = ( 4 ε )l 0 and any K 1 > 0 we obtain that
Note that the above inequalities hold regardless of how we pick K 1 .
Proof: P(E 2 c,cN ,K,I ) < ε 4 . Following inequality (24) we set
and by diving the right hand side equality of inequality (25) by I e i we obtain 0 < e i−1 e i = 1 − (c − c)
Hence, applying Fact 2 with any interval [e i+1 , e i ] together with (26) we obtain that the probability of N or more up-crossings for any given sub-interval is not more than Consequently, the probability that some sub-interval is up-crossed N or more times is no more than each sub-interval in I is covered by at least J I elements from A, and since 
